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NOTES
THE FEDERAL JURISDICTIONAL AMOUNT REQUIREMENT
AND JOINDER OF PARTIES UNDER THE FEDERAL
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure articulate a utilitarian objective of an efficient judicial process effectuated, in part, by encouraging
the settlement in one action of all issues arising from a single transaction or occurrence. However, the implementation of this important
purpose is frequently subverted by an overly narrow construction of
federal jurisdictional limitations. In particular, the present interpretation
of the jurisdictional amount requirement has deprived litigants of the
contemplated benefits of the liberal provisions concerning permissive
joinder of parties. The resulting inconvenience to the parties is occasioned by a splitting of the action when several plaintiffs, otherwise
properly joined, are relegated to the state courts for inability to assert
the requisite jurisdictional amount. A brief examination of the justifications which have, in the past, supported a restrictive approach to
federal jurisdiction discloses their present inapplicability in view of. the
reorientation of procedure introduced by the Federal Rules. Although
Congressional justifications for a jurisdictional amount requirement remain valid and not incompatible with the joinder of parties, a suggested
reinterpretation of the amount provision in accordance with the policy
of the Federal Rules seems necessary.
The basic conflict of policy between the joinder provisions of the
Federal Rules and the present interpretation of the jurisdictional amount
requirement of the Judicial Code was clearly presented in the recent case
of Anicola v. J. C. Penney Company.' The plaintiff-wife's suit to recover
$3000 for injuries caused by defendant's negligence was joined with the
plaintiff-husband's claim of $1500 for loss of consortium.' Had joinder
of plaintiffs, which is virtually unlimited under Rule 20,3 been the sole
1. 98 F. Supp. 911 (E.D. Pa. 1951).,
2. Plaintiffs were attempting to join under a Pennsylvania rule of civil procedure
1
identical, in effect, to Federal Rule 20.
3. FED. R. Civ. P. 20 provides: "Permissive Joinder of Parties. (a) Permissive
Joinder. All persons may join in one action as plaintiffs if they assert any right to
relief jointly, severally, or in the alternative in respect of, or arising out of, the
same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences and if any
question of law or fact common to all of them will arise in the action."
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consideration, joinder would have been permitted and both claims, arising
from the same occurrence, would have been settled in one action. However, the court held that the two claims could not be joined to aggregate
the jurisdictional amount. Therefore, the husband's claim was dismissed
for want of jurisdiction, and the wife was given leave to amend and
allege a claim exceeding $3000.
Although the jurisdictional amount requirement is not constitutionally imposed, a statutory limitation has existed since the original Judiciary
Act of 1789.1 The Judicial Code presently provides that the federal
district courts shallhave original jurisdiction over all civil actions, involving a federal question or a controversy between citizens of different
states, wherein the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of
$3000 .5 Thus, the only change in the jurisdictional amount facet of
the limitations on federal jurisdiction has been an increase from the
original $500 to $2000 in 18876 to the present $3000 in 1911.7
Congressional reluctance to confer full jurisdiction s and judicial
adherence to the principle of strict construction of jurisdictional grants
are purportedly based on several considerations. One justification concerns the relationship between federal and state courts, which at times
within our history has been of practical political importance. 9 The
jurisdictional amount requirement, however, has never been of any great
consequence in effectuating this desired comity, since it has only a
tenuous connection with the issue of federalism in the court system.' 0
More relevant, and considered by some writers to be the most important
basis for the amount requirement, is the desirability of reducing the bur4. 1

STAT.

78 (1789).

5. "28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question); § 1332 (diversity of citizenship). Statutory
exceptions to the requirement include actions arising under any Act of Congress regulating commerce, id. § 1337; actions arising under any Act of Congress relating to
patents, copyrights, or trademarks, id. § 1338; all matters and proceedings in bankruptcy, id. § 1334. Insofar as the problem presently considered is concerned, diversity
is the principal area of jurisdiction requiring an amount in controversy since, frequently, federal question cases may be brought under a special statute not requiring a
jurisdictional amount.

6. 24

STAT.

552 (1887).

7. 36 STAT. 1087 (1911).
8. See Frankfurter, Distribution of Judicial Power Between United States and
State Courts, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 499 (1928). Since the lealing case on the diversity
requirement, Strawbridge v. Curtis, 3 Cranch 267 (U.S. 1806), federal jurisdiction
based on diversity of citizenship has always been construed to require complete diversity.
However, it has been suggested that the Constitutional grant of jurisdiction over controversies between citizens of different states requires only partial diversity. Chafee, Federal Interpleader Since the Act of 1936, 49 YALE L.J. 377 (1940).
9. See Healy v. Ratta, 292 U.S. 263 (1933) ; Frankfurter, supra note 8, at 500.
10. Shulman and Jaegerman,.Some JurisdictionalLimitations on Federal Procedure,
45 YALE L.J. 393 (1936).

NOTES
den on the federal courts. 1 ' Admittedly, the requirement has this effect,
2
but only in furtherance of its main function of protecting litigantsY.'
Litigation in the federal courts is more expensive in time and money, and
the requirement of a minimum amount in controversy is designed to confine suits involving small sums to state tribunals.
It should be noted that the statutory requirement has never, in
terms, stated that ea ch plaintiff must have the specific amount in controversy. However, the fundamental tenet of federal courts to view their
jurisdictional limits strictly is nowhere more strongly reflected than in
the construction placed upon the jurisdictional amount requirement. First
enunciated in Oliver v. Alexander,'3 the general rule is that each plaintiff, claiming separately, must assert a claim exceeding the, jurisdictional
amount. Only when plaintiffs assert a common right may the aggregated
value of their claims be the measure of the necessary sum in dispute. 14
This narrow interpretation, adopted in the Alexander case, has since
been adhered to with rare exceptions.' 5
In 1934, after many years of effort by interested groups, Congress
empowered the Supreme Court to prescribe rules for the district courts
of the United States and the District of Columbia.:' The rules were to
be purely procedural: "said rules shall neither abridge, enlarge, nor
modify the substantive rights of any litigant."' 7 The Supreme Court
appointed a distinguished Advisory Committee to assist in the formulation of the rules, and, in accomplishing this undertaking, the Advisory
Committee received suggestions, advice, and criticism from members
11. Id. at 416.
12. "Congress has always .been unwilling to permit suits for small sums to be
brought into its own Courts, not because it specially wanted to save the Courts labor,
or even because it wished to uphold their dignity, but principally, if not solely, for
the protection of litigants. Where the amounts at issue are not large, litigation in
the federal courts may be unduly burdensome." RosE, FEDEi. JURISDICrIoN AND
PROCEDURE 211 (5th ed. 1938). See Adams v. Douglas County, 1 Fed. Cas. No. 52, at
106, 107 (C.C.D.Kan. 1868).
13. 6 Pet. 143 (U.S. 1832). The Court was considering the amount requirement
for appeal to the Supreme Court.
14. Shields v. Thomas, 17 How. 3 (U.S. 1855). For early development of the
jurisdictional amount requirement, see the discussion in Gibson v. Shufeldt, 122 U.S.
27 (1887). See also, 27 VA. L. REv. 704 (1941).
15. See Dobie, JurisdictionalAmount in the United States District Courts, 11 VA.
L. REG. (N.S.) 513 (1926). The construction adopted in the Alexander case was applied
for the first time to the amount requirement for district court jurisdiction in Walter. v.
Northeastern R. R., 140 U.S. 370 (1892).
16. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1948). Prior to the adoption of the Federal Rules, procedure
in federal district courts was to conform with the procedure in state courts. For a
history of procedure in the federal courts, see HoLTzonF, NEW FEDERAL PROCEDURE AND
THE COURTS 1-8 (1940).
17. Ibid.
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of the bar throughout the nation.' Following two years of work by
the Committee, the proposed Rules were adopted by the Supreme Court,
forwarded to Congress, and became effective September 16, 1938.
Basically, the Rules seek to foster an efficient judicial process to be
accomplished in part by enabling the settlement, in one suit, of all issues
arising out of one transaction.: 9 Particularly, "on the matter of joinder
...it is desirable that all matters in dispute between litigants be brought
to issue and settled quickly and directly as possible." 2 0 The considerations underlying this policy are evident, although of no little importance.
Joinder reduces the time and expense of litigation for the -parties as well
23
22
as for the courts. 21 The liberal Rules on counterclaims, cross-claims,
third party practice, 24 and interpleader 2 5 emphasize the desire to imple-

ment fully this basic proposition.
A re-examination of the jurisdictional amount requirement in the
light of the policy manifested by the Federal Rules suggests the desirability of accepting the jurisdiction of all claims arising out of one
transaction where one plaintiff asserts a claim exceeding the jurisdictional
amount. That this is an acceptable solution is indicated by the statute
governing removal of actions from state to federal courts, where a
similar approach is expressly adopted. 26 Provided one plaintiff, with a
separate and independent cause of action, satisfies the original juris18. See

AmERiCAN BAR ASSOCIATION, PROCEEDINGS OF THE INSTITUTE ON FEDERAL
(1938) ; PROCEEDINGS OF THE INSTITUTE ON FEDERAL RULES, WASH-

RULES, CLEVELAND

INGTON AND NEW YORK

(1938).

19. See Clark, The New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: The Last Phase-

Underlying Philosopby Embodied in Some of the Basic Provisions of the New Procedure, 23 A.B.A.J. 976 (1937).
20. Clark, supra note 19, at 977; Clark, Proposed Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
22 A.B.A.J. 447, 449 (1936).
21. "The primary purpose of any set of rules for legal procedure would seem to

be clarity and certainty in conjunction with possibilities of celerity in the dispatch of
business. The main purpose to be kept in mind is the convenience and saving, of time
of witnesses and parties and minimizing expenses of litigation so far as is consistent
with the preservation of substantial rights of parties." Chestnut, Analysis of Proposed
New FederalRules of Civil Procedure,22 A.B.A.J. 533, 534 (1936).
22. FED. R. Civ. P. 13 (a) and (b). For a discussion of jurisdictional problems
under Rule 13, see Ohlinger, Jurisdiction, Venue and Process as to Counterclaims and
Third Party Claims; Rules 13 and 14 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 6 FED.

B.J. 420 (1945).
23. FED. R. Civ. P. 13 (g) and (h).
24.

FED. R. Civ. P. 14. For a discussion of jurisdictional problems, see Holtzoff,

Some Problems Under Third Party Practice, 3 LA. L. REV. 408 (1941) ; Shulman and
Jaegerman, supra note 10; Comment, 46 MICH. L. REv. 1069 (1948).
25. FED. R. Civ. P. 22. See Chafee, supra note 8.
26. 28 U.S.C. 9 1441 (c): "Whenever a separate and independent claim or cause of
action, which would be removable if sued upon alone, is joined with one or more other-

wise non-removable claims or causes of action, the entire case may be removed and the
district court may determine all issues therein, or, in its discretion, may remand all
matters not otherwise within its original jurisdiction."

NOTES
diction requirements of the federal court, the court may retain all
claims not otherwise within its original jurisdiction. Thus, in respect to
removal, Congress has recognized the "souhd social policy"2 7 underlying
the joinder of parties provision and has intimated that the preservation
of federalism in the court system may, in certain instances, yield to the
consideration of convenience to the parties. 28 A contrary proposal-that
of allowing the suit to be split-was attempted from 1866 to 1876 and
resulted in ". .. confusion, embarrassment, and increase in the cost of
litigation. ."29
These were sufficient grounds for providing-that the
entire action could be removed to the federal court, ". . . thereby expressly conferring ancillary or incidental jurisdiction to hear and determine a controversy wholly between citizens of the same state," 30 or
a controversy in which less than the jurisdictional amount was involved.
No such encroachment on state judicial power is involved in the suggestion under consideration as proper joinder and other requisites of
jurisdiction would continue to be applicable.3 1 Consequently, the sole
effect of the reinterpretation of the amount requirement would be to permit jurisdiction of suits in which all parties comply with other jurisdictional requirements, and one plaintiff asserts a claim exceeding $3000. No
tenable objection is apparent as to why original jurisdiction should not
be as broad as removal jurisdiction. Inconveniences similar to those
alleviated by the removal statute should also be avoided when original
jurisdiction is invoked.
A more liberal interpretation would not substantially increase the
burdens of the federal courts, for even under the present construction
the courts retain jurisdiction of the claim meeting the amount requirement. The right of action of each party must arise out of "the same
transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences," and a
common question of law or fact must be involved for plaintiffs to join
under Rule 20. Hence, in most cases, substantially the same proof would
27. See Clark, Proposed Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 22 A.B.A.J. 447, 449
(1936).
1 28. See MOORE,

COMMENTARY ON THE UNITED STATES JUDICIAL CODE

253 (1949),

for comment on constitutionality of the removal statute and some justifications for it.
29. Texas Employers Insurance Ass'n v. Felt, 150 F.2d 227, 234 (5th Cir. 1945).
During that period plaintiff could continue his suit in the state court against those
defendants who could not remove to the federal court.
30. Ibid.
31. If the aims of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were to be completely
effectuated, it would require a modification of the rule of Strawbridge v. Curtis. But, requiring only partial diversity of citizenship would greatly increase litigation in the federal courts. A consideration of the merits or lack of merits in diversity jurisdiction is
beyond the scope of this discussion, although jurisdictional problems in this area are
comparable to those discussed presently, insofar as they relate to effective implementation
of the Federal Rules.
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be admissible in support of all claims, On the other hand, refusal to
adjudicate those claims which do not exceed the requisite amount not
only may inconvenience the plaintiffs, but also increases unnecessarily
the case load in the state courts. Further, the benefit of retaining jurisdiction of all claims inures to the defendant in eliminating the necessity
of defending two actions-one or more in the state court and one in the
federal court.
In the past, plaintiffs' attempts to join as here suggested have encountered summary rejection.3 2 Among the arguments advanced against
the present proposal is that plaintiffs may not aggregate their claims to
achieve the jurisdictional amount. 33 However, the problem is not one of
aggregation. Jurisdiction of the entire action would be invoked by one
plaintiff's assertion of the requisite amount and the amount, large or small,
of other plaintiff's claims would seem to be of little consequence. Yet,
present judicial characterizing of the attempted joinder as an attempt to
aggregate claims brings the issue within the general rule of Oliver v.
Alexander and permits dismissal without thorough consideration of the
problem.
In the past, conditions may have justified the restrictive consequences
of viewing joinder as an aggregation question. The possibilities for
forum shopping afforded by the Swift v. Tyson doctrine, 34 furnished a
real need for examining closely the asserted basis for federal jurisdiction,
including the jurisdictional amount requirement. The demise of that rule
removed an important justification for narrowly construing the amount
provision. Furthermore, when the rule against aggregation was declared in the Alexander case, joinder of parties with separate causes of
action was extremely limited, 35 while today joinder is encouraged. The
Alexander case itself involved the amount requirement for appellate
jurisdiction; later decisions applied the rule to the amount requirement
32. See note 37 infra.
33. Pinel v. Pinel, 240 U.S. 594 (1916); Atwood v. National Bank of Lima, 115
F.2d 861 (6th Cir. 1940); Diepen v. Fernow, 1 F.R.D. 378 (W.D. Mich. 1940) (The
proposal here advanced was the basis for the attempt to join as plaintiffs in this case) ;
Hagee v. Kansas City S. Ry., 104 Fed. 391 (C.C.W.D.Mo. 1900); Note, 80 U. OF PA.
L. REv.106 (1931).

34. 16 Pet. 1 (U.S. 1842). The case interpreted the Rules of Decision Act, 28
U.S.C. § 1652 (1948), to mean that federal courts were not bound to follow state
judicial decisions. Erie v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), overruled this in holding
that the laws of the state, which the federal courts must apply "except in matters
governed by the Federal Constitution or by acts of Congress," included state judicial
decisions.
35. ".

.

. [Tlhe common law will not tolerate a joint action except by persons who

have a joint interest and upon a joint contract. If the cause of action is several, the
suit must be several also." Oliver v. Alexander, 6 Pet. 143, 146 (U.S. 1832).

NOTES
for original jurisdiction.30 Although there are, as previously noted, other
cogent reasons for the amount requirement, insofar as protection to litigants is concerned, the two situations differ considerably. Denial of an
opportunity to appeal terminates the case forthwith. However, a refusal
to accept original jurisdiction merely relegates the, claimant to the state
courts, splitting the trial of causes arising out of the same transaction
when some claimants can and others cannot satisfy the jurisdictional
amount.37 An uncritical acceptance of the Alexander rule is unjustifiable
in the light of these changed circumstances.
Another objection to a construction of the amount requirement
granting the court jurisdiction over claims less than the requisite amount
is that the jurisdiction of the court would be extended in violation of
Rule 82, which proscribes construction of the Federal Rules so as to
extend or limit the jurisdiction or, venue of actions in the federal
courts. 38 However, the suggestion that federal jurisdiction embrace all
!plaintiffs, properly joined, in a suit in which one plaintiff claims the
requisite amount is not extending the jurisdiction 'of the federal courts
by virtue of any one of the Federal Rules. Jurisdiction would be posited,
not on the grounds that Rule 20 permits joinder, but rather because the
jurisdictional amount requirement need only be met by one plaintiff. A
reinterpretation of the requirement is not prohibited by Rule 82.
In addition, Rule 82 has not been insurmountable in the construction
of other Rules. For instance, if there is jurisdiction in the main cause,
the defendant may bring in a third party defendant without proving
independent grounds of jurisdiction. 3 9 Moreover, until 1946 this view
was accepted even when the third party defendant was impleaded on the
theory that he was liable directly to the plaintiff. 40 Although the basis
36. See note 15 supra.
37. Hackner v. Guaranty Truit Co., .117 F.2d 95 (2d Cir. 1941); Takashi Kataoka
v. May Dept. Stores Co., 115 F.2d 521 (9th Cir. 1940); Mitchell v. Great American
Indemnity Co., 87 F. Supp. 961 (W.D. La. 1950); Shapiro Bros. Factors Corp. v.
Automobile Insurance Co., 40 F. Supp. 1 (D. N.J. 1941); cf. Edelhertz v. Matlack, 42
F. Supp. 309 (M.D. Pa. 1941); Grosvenor v. Guenther, 42 F. Supp. 249 (E.D. Mich.
1941).
38. See Diepen v. Fernow, 1 F.R.D. 378 (W.D. Mich. 1940).
39. Shepperd v. Atlantic States Gas Co. of Pennsylvania, Inc.v. Pennsylvania R.R.,
167 F.2d 841 (3rd Cir. 1948); Goodard v. Shasta S.S. Co. v. Oldman Boiler Works,
Inc., 9 F.R.D. 12 (W.D. N.Y. 1949).
40. Before the 1948 amendments to.the Federal Rules, defendant could be impleaded
on this theory. This provision was deleted due to holdings that plaintiff was not required to amend his pleading to assess a claim against the third -party defendant unless
he so chose and that he could not do so if the third party could not have been joined
originally. Friend v. Middle Atlantic Transportation Co., 153 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1946),
cert. denied, 328 U.S. 865 (1946). (First time question was presented on the appellate
level.) See Clark, Experience Under the Ainendinents to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure,8 F.R.D. 497 (1949).

206
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for third party practice, avoidance of circuity of action, is no more significant than the purposes underlying joinder of parties, the consideration
of settling all issues arising out of one transaction is presently given
effect by adjudicating a claim by defendant, not within the original jurisdiction of the court. The new claim is regarded as being within the
41
court's ancillary jurisdiction, a judicially created concept, and the proscription of Rule 82 is successfully evaded. An equally liberal construction has been accorded Rule 82 with respect to the service of process
43
under Rule 4(f) .42 Under the Federal Interpleader Statute an interesting technique has been employed to circumvent the jurisdictional requirement of diversity of citizenship. If a stakeholder and one of the
claimants are co-citizens, the stakeholder is held to be a nominal party
and the diversity requirement is satisfied by the citizenship of the claimants. 4 4 If all the claimants are co-citizens, the stakeholder institutes his
action under common law interpleader and is regarded as a real party in
interest resulting in necessary diversity between the stakeholder and the
claimants. 45 Evidently, jurisdictional limitations may be elastic when
procedural conditions so warrant.
An even greater departure from the Alexander rule would permit
federal courts to take jurisdiction when all plaintiffs' claims aggregate
the requisite amount, although no one plaintiff's claim exceeds that
amount. Arguments supporting such a proposal are again predicated on
the convenience to the parties of settling all claims in one suit. However,
denial of jurisdiction would work no hardship by splitting the suit, since
under the present decisions no one plaintiff may invoke federal jurisdiction. Furthermore, the amount requirement, in effect, would be removed where there are multiple plaintiffs as it would be a rare case in
which aggregation of plaintiffs' claims would not e:ceed $3000. The
result would be an unnecessary increase in litigation in federal courts,
and it is questionable whether any resulting convenience to the parties
would outweigh the added burden on the federal courts.
41. See Silberg, Ancillary Jurisdiction in the Federal Courts, 12 J. AIR L. 288

(1941).
42. Mississippi Publishing Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438 (1946). The Murphree
case held that Rule 4(f) enlarged federal court jurisdictional limits to include the whole
state, where the courts, prior to the Rules, would have had jurisdiction only within their
respective districts.
43. 28 U.S.C. § 1335 (1948) ; FED. R. Civ. P. 22.
44. Treines v. Sunshine Mining Co., 308 U.S. 66 (1939). Citizenship of a nominal
party is not considered under the rule of Strawbridge v. Curtis. Notes, 5 Mo. L. REv. 249

(1940) ; 25

WASH.

U.L.Q. 479 (1940).

45. Rosetti v. Hill, 162 F.2d 892 (9th Cir. 1947); Note, 21 So. CALIF. L.
(1948).

REv.
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If the federal courts are unwilling to adopt a more liberal view of
the amount requirement, reversing a long line of precedents, the conflict
could to some extent be alleviated by refusing to entertain jurisdiction
of an original action where the result would be to split the suit. A. prudent exercise of discretion in a situation concerning splitting of suits
arising out of the same transaction would depend, primarily, upon
whether joinder is permitted in the state court involved. 46 If it were
possible for all plaintiffs to join in that court, then the federal court
should refuse to exercise original jurisdiction. Should plaintiffs join
in the state court and defendant, if a non-resident, removed to a federal
court, where under the remand statute the court has been conferred an
expressly limited discretion to retain the entire suit or remand all claims
not within its original jurisdiction, then the federal court should retain
and adjudicate all claims. If joinder is precluded under the state procedure, the federal court could properly take jurisdiction of the individual claims meeting the jurisdictional amount requirement. Plaintiffs
could not join in any event, and the particular plaintiff may be removed
to the federal court.
Federal courts in equity historically have exercised discretion in
refusing to invoke their jurisdiction. 47 In relation to the present problem,
such discretion should be exercised only when it is important that a
cause be litigated in a state court rather than federal 4four.l4 5 If the
reform inherent in the Rules cannot be effectuated in the federal courts,
and the result may be achieved in the state court, the suit should be litigated in the latter. Although no American cases have been found in
which a court sitting in law has attempted to exercise such discretion, 49
46.

1933).

For Indiana rule on joinder of parties, see IND. STAT. ANN.

§2-213

(Burns

In Indiana joinder of parties with separate causes of action is not possible;

however, the courts have an inherent power to order actions consolidated for trial.
"The result is in truth the same as that accomplished under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure . . . so that after all the question presented is one of trial convenience,.
depending largely upon the question as to whether or not the actions present a common
question of law and fact." 2 GAvir, PLEADING AND PRACTICE IN INDIANA 1874 (1941).
47. See, e.g., Burford v. Sun Oil Corp., 319 U.S. 315 (1948); Railroad Comm. of
Texas v. Pullman Corp., 312 U.S. 496 (1940); Pennsylvania v. Williams, 294 U.S. 176

(1925).
48. Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228 (1943). Fot" important policies which
are sufficient cause for refusing to exercise jurisdiction, see Pennsylvania v. Williams,
294 U.S. 176 (1925).
49. However, "courts of equity and of law also occasionally decline, in the interest
of justice, to exercise jurisdiction, where the Suit is between aliens or non-residents or
where for kindred reasons the litigation can more appropriately be conducted in a
foreign tribunal." Canada Malting Co. v. Paterson Steamships, 285 U.S. 413, 422 (1932).
For an English case in which a court of law refused to exercise, its jurisdiction, see
Logan v. Bank of Scotland [1906] 1 K.B. 141 (C.A.) (Court in London refused jurisdiction where cause of action arose in Scotland, all the witnesses and evidence were in
Scotland, and the branch bank in London had no concern in the cause of action.)
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there seems to be no basis for limiting the exercise of this prerogative
to cases of an equitable nature. The importance of the purpose of the
Federal Rules should be controlling, whether the court exercises law or
equity powers. Actions at law based solely on diversity of citizenship
as grounds for federal jurisdiction seldom present such important questions that it is imperative a federal court take cognizance of them.
Refusal to exercise jurisdiction to avoid splitting the suit is
similar to the venue doctrine of forum non conveniens. Introduced into
the federal system by judicial decision, 50 statutory authorization was
unnecessary to grant courts discretion to dismiss on grounds of the
existence of a more convenient forum. Similarly, the absence of specific
congressional approval should not restrict judicial solution of the present
situation. The advantage to the parties of litigating all claims in one
action is equally as important as the trying of a cause in a convenient
forum and is a reasonable basis for federal courts, in law and equity, -to
refuse to exercise their jurisdiction. 51
The problem of the jurisdictional amount requirement as a deterrent
to the implementation of the Federal Rules has been placed in proper
perspective. There is no extension of jurisdiction problem within the
meaning of Rule 82 as many courts assume; nor is it a matter of aggregating claims to achieve the jurisdictional amount. Removal of this
impediment to an effective utilization of the joinder provisions of the
Rules requires a new interpretation of the amount requirement. The
present rule rests on conditions of over a century ago which are no longer
relevant to the main purpose of the amount requirement. While not
greatly increasing the work of the federal courts, the acceptance of juris50. The doctrine was first evolved in England and adopted by the courts in law
and equity in several of the American states. The federal courts have been reluctant
but eventually accepted the doctrine prior to statutory enactment. Gulf Oil Corp. v.
Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947). See Note, 23 INn. L.J. 82 (1947); Comment, 1 STAN. L.

REv. 497 (1949).

51. Two statutory changes, although, not within the scope of this discussion, are
possibilities in the solution of the problem. Abolition of diversity of citizenship as a
basis of federal jurisdiction would remove the only practical justification for requiring a
jurisdictional amount. With only federal question cases litigated in the federal courts,
no jurisdictionl amount should be necessary. This change was embodied in the NorrisLaGuardia Bill, S. 939, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. (1932), H.R. 11508, 72d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1932), but failed to become law. See Frankfurter, supra note 8; Yntema, The Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts in ControversiesBetween Citizens of Different States, 19
A.B.A.J. 71, 149, 265 (1933).
Removal of foreign corporations from their status as non-residents would have
substantially the same effect as complete abolition of diversity since it is estimated that
80% of diversity cases involve corporations. This suggestion, too, has been before
Congress. Attorney-General's Bill, S. 937, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. (1932); H.R. 10594,
72d Cong., 1st Sess. (1932). For interesting statistics concerning the jurisdictional basis
for litigation in federal courts see Clark, Diversity of Citizenship Jurisdiction of the
Federal Courts, 19 A.B.A.J. 499 (1933).

NOTES
diction of all claims arising from one transaction where one plaintiff
asserts a claim exceeding the requisite jurisdictional amount would accommodate litigants by preventing duplicate suits in state and federal
courts and a multiplicity of suits in state courts where joinder is less
liberal. Although the new interpretation would require a modification
of the judicial practice to strictly construe jurisdictional requirements, it
would permit the policy underlying the Federal Rules, an equally basic
judicial policy, to be more fully implemented.

ACCESS TO OFFICIAL INFORMATION: A NEGLECTED
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT
The Las Cruces Sun-News, a New Mexico newspaper, recently
rought permission to attend a United States Navy test firing of a special
rocket at White Sands proving grounds. The request was denied for "security reasons." 1 Earlier this year investigation through confidential
sources revealed that in 1950 the Bureau of Internal Revenue discovered
the adulteration of liquor in 368 taverns in the vicinity of Albany, New
York. The Bureau levied fines upon the offenders without bringing
them into court or revealing the fraud. The Bureau's chief counsel
took the position that such compromises are not matters of public record,
2
but are effected solely in the interest of the individual and the Bureau..
In Oregon, a secret hearing was held by the state board of education
concerning the demand of the dental school to be separated from the
university medical school.3 The board offered to allow a reporter to
attend only on the condition that she pledge to keep the matter "off the
1. Advance clipping from Shop Talk, Oct. 1, 1951, the official publication of the
New Mexico Press Ass'n, Inc.
OF INFORMATION TO AMERICAN
2. INTERIM REPORT OF COMMiTTEE ON FREEmO
SOCIETY OF NEwSPAPER EDITORS 4 (April 21, 1951). Other records not readily available

to the public in New Yoik include marriage licenses. In Yonkers, only 63 of 123 issued
in January and 15 of the 40 obtained in February were made public. Id. at 3. Many
other instances of official secrecy are revealed in Pope, Suppression of News, Atlantic
Monthly, July, 1951, p. 50.
3. Communication to the INDIANA LAW JOURNAL from the Oregonian. The letter
also describes a secret hearing conducted by the state director of agriculture concerning

certain dairies' violations of the sanitary bottle-cap law. The director took the position
that bad publicity might injure the violators' business.

The secrecy which encompasses meetings of school boards is not peculiar to
Oregon. The public has been barred from school board deliberations in Chicago, Ill.;
Columbia, Mo.; Denver, Colo.; Roanoke, Va.; Providence, R. I.; Evansville, Ind.; Flint,
Mich.; and Baltimore, Md., "just to name a few." Raymond, News the People Can't Get,
Reporter No. 7, Oct. 2, 1951, p. 26.

